We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We show that a uniformly chosen voter profile for a neutral social choice function f of q ≥ 4 alternatives and n voters will be manipulable with probability at least 10 −4 ǫ 2 n −3 q −30 , where ǫ is the minimal statistical distance between f and the family of dictator functions.
Introduction
Social choice theory studies methods of collective decision making, and their interplay with social welfare and individual preference and behavior. Rigorous study of social choice dates back to the 18'th century, when Condorcet discovered the following voting paradox: in a social ranking of three alternatives that is determined by the majority vote, an 'irrational' circular ranking may occur where a candidate A is preferred over a candidate B, B is preferred over C, and C is preferred over A. Social choice theory in its modern form was established in the 1950's with the discovery of Arrow's impossibility theorem [Arr50, Arr63] , which showed that all social ranking systems that satisfy a few reasonable conditions must either obtain irrational circular outcomes, or be dictatorships (a dictatorship is a system where the ranking is determined by just one voter).
Manipulations. Many of the results in the study of social choice are negative, showing that certain desired properties of social choice schemes cannot be attained. One of the hallmark examples of such theorems was proved by Gibbard and Satterthwaite [Gib73, Sat75] . Their theorem considers a voting system where each of n voters rank q alternatives, and the winner is determined according to some pre-defined social choice function f : L n q → [q] of all the voters' rankings-here L q denotes the set of total orderings of the q alternatives.
We say that a social choice function is manipulable, if a situation may occur where a voter who knows the rankings given by other voters can change her own ranking in a way that does not reflect her true preferences, but which leads to an outcome that is more desirable to her. Formally Definition 1.1 (Manipulation point). For a ranking x ∈ L q , write a x > b to denote that the alternative a is preferred by x over b. A social choice function f : L n q → [q] is manipulable at x ∈ L n q if there exist a y ∈ L n q and i ∈ [n] such that x and y only differ in the i'th coordinate and f (y)
In this case we also say that x is a manipulation point of f , and that (x, y) is a manipulation pair for f . We say that f is manipulable, if it is manipulable at some point x. We also say that x is an r-manipulation point of f , if f has a manipulation pair (x, y) such that y is obtained from x by permuting (at most) r adjacent alternatives in one of the coordinates of x.
Gibbard and Satterthwaite proved that any social choice function which attains three or more values, and whose outcome does not depend on just one voter, must be manipulable. Theorem 1.2 (Gibbard-Satterthwaite [Gib73, Sat75] ). Any social choice function f : L n q → [q] which takes at least three values and is not a dictator is manipulable.
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has contributed significantly to the realization that it is unlikely to expect truthfulness in the context of voting. In a way, this and other results in social choice theory, contributed to the development of mechanism design, a field centered around developing social mechanisms that obtain desirable results even when each member of the society acts selfishly.
Quantitative social choice. Theorem 1.2 is tight in the sense that monotone social choice functions which are dictators or only have two possible outcomes are indeed non-manipulable (a function is non-monotone, and clearly manipulable, if for some set of rankings a voter can change the outcome from say a to b by moving a ahead of b in his preference). It is interesting, however, to study manipulation quantitatively, asking not just whether a function is manipulable but how many manipulations occur in it. To state results in quantitative social choice we need to define the distance between social choice functions. Definition 1.3 (Distance between social choice functions). The distance D(f, g) between two social choice functions f, g : L n q → [q] is defined as the fraction of inputs on which they differ: D(f, g) = P[f (X) = g(X)], where X ∈ L n q is uniformly selected. For a class G of social functions, we write D(f, G) = min g∈G D(f, g).
We also define some classes of functions that may not have any manipulation points. Definition 1.4. We use the following three classes of functions, defined for parameters n and q that remain implicit (when used, the parameters will be obvious from the context):
| f is either a dictator or takes at most two values}
Our results
Our results only apply to social choice functions which are neutral. A social choice function is neutral if it is invariant under changes made to the names of the alternatives (see Definition 2.1 for a formal description). In our first main result we show the following lower bound on the number of manipulation points in a neutral social function:
where X ∈ L n q is selected uniformly.
Note that the result above directly implies the following:
where X ∈ L n q is selected uniformly, and Y is obtained from X by uniformly selecting a coordinate i ∈ {1, .., n} and resetting the i'th coordinate to a random preference.
The result above has super exponential dependency on the number of alternatives q. A more refined analysis yields the following theorem. Theorem 1.7 (main theorem). Fix q ≥ 4 and let f : L n q → [q] be a neutral social choice function with D(f, DICT) ≥ ǫ. Then,
where X ∈ L n q is uniformly selected. A result similar to Theorem 1.7 was obtained for the case q = 3 in [FKN09] , but the result of [FKN09] counted manipulation pairs rather than manipulation points. Translating the bound on the fraction of manipulation points in Theorem 1.7 directly to the case of pairs deteriorates the lower bound, inserting a factor of q! in the denominator. However using the stronger bound on the fraction of 4-manipulation points, a direct corollary lower bounds the fraction of manipulation pairs of a certain kind while keeping the polynomial dependency on q.
Corollary 1.8 (manipulation pairs). Fix q ≥ 4 and let f :
where X ∈ L n q is uniformly selected, and Y is obtained from X by uniformly selecting a coordinate i ∈ {1, .., n}, then selecting 4 adjacent alternatives in X i and randomly permuting them.
The case of large q, solved here, was left as the main open problem in [FKN09] . Their main motivation was that deriving quantitative versions of Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems with polynomial dependency of q and n would indicate that from the computational complexity point of view it is easy on average to find manipulation points. This point is discussed in more detail in the related work subsection.
Our lower bound for the number of manipulation points deteriorates polynomially with the number of voters, n, and the number q of alternatives. Some polynomial deterioration as a function of n is necessary. This can be observed by considering the plurality function pl : L n q → [q], whose value is defined to be the candidate which is top ranked by the largest number of voters (break ties by picking the candidate which is top ranked by the 'leftmost' voter). It is easy to observe that a point where no ties are formed is not a manipulation point of pl, and that for any fixed q the fraction of points that do contain ties is polynomially small in n. As for the dependency on q-we do not know whether it is necessary.
History and related work
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem presented a difficulty in designing social choice functions, namely that of strategic voting. A line of research aimed at overcoming these difficulties suggested constructions of social choice functions where it is computationally difficult for a voter to find beneficial manipulation [BTT89, BO91, CS03, EL05] . However these constructions considered worst case analysis-they did not rule out the possibility that on average, finding a manipulation may be easy. Indeed, some results showed that finding manipulations is easy on average for certain restricted classes of social choice functions [PR06, CS06, Kel93] (see also the survey [FP10] ).
Recently, a result of Friedgut, Kalai and Nisan [FKN09] provided a very general result, showing that in the case of a neutral social choice function between 3 alternatives even a random attempted manipulation is beneficial for a voter with non-negligible probability. Adapted to our notation, the main result of [FKN09] can be stated as follows: 
where X ∈ L n 3 is uniformly selected, and Y is obtained from X by uniformly selecting a coordinate i ∈ {1, .., n} and resetting the i'th coordinate to a random preference.
Choosing X, Y randomly as in Theorem 1.9, the result of [FKN09] implies that a manipulation pair is obtained with non-negligible probability (at most polynomially small in n), and thus a manipulation pair can be found efficiently as long as f can be efficiently evaluated. Note however that the computational problem discussed above is different from the problem considered in previous work [BO91, CS03, EL05, PR06, CS06] , where the complexity studied was that of finding a beneficial manipulation for a specific voter, given the declared preferences of all other voters -since [FKN09] considers only three alternatives, a voter with access to the social choice function can easily try all permutations of the alternatives to find a manipulation. Corollary 1.6 and Corollary 1.8, which extend the result of [FKN09] to the case of 4 or more alternatives, are thus more relevant with respect to the hardness of finding a manipulation. They imply that in the case were votes are cast uniformly at random, a random change of preference for a random voter will yield a beneficial manipulation with non-negligible probability-at most polynomially small in q and n by Corollary 1.8. Thus in the setup of [BO91, CS03, EL05, PR06, CS06], with positive probability, a single voter with black-box access to f can efficiently manipulate. This implies that approach of masking manipulations behind computational hardness cannot hide manipulations completely.
We note that there are other (independent) extensions of [FKN09] for more candidates. Xia and Conitzer [XC08] applied the proof strategy of [FKN09] to show that for some social choice functions with n voters and a fixed number m of alternatives, starting with a uniformly random voting profile and then randomly resetting the ranking of one of the voters yields a manipulation pair with probability Ω(1/n). Their proof requires a number of properties of the social choice functions including anonymity (the social choice outcome depends only on the number of times each order was chosen), homogeneity (if each vote is replaced by t identical votes the outcome remains the same), canceling out (this condition related to neutralityit says that one can cancel any subset of the votes which contains each order exactly once). Most importantly the results of Xia and Conitzer require that certain outcomes are robust (will not change if a small linear fraction of the voters cast a specific order) and the result does not give bounds on the frequency of manipulations in terms of m, the number of alternatives. The later point implies that the results do not have implications for the hardness of finding a manipulation in the setup of [BO91, CS03, EL05, PR06, CS06].
We further note that Dobzinski and Procaccia [DP08] established an analogous result for the case of two voters and any number of candidates, under a comparably weak assumption on the voting rule.
Techniques
The result of [FKN09] are obtained by mixing combinatorial techniques with discrete harmonic analysis. In contrast, our techniques are purely geometric and combinatorial. In particular, we apply a variant of the a canonical path method to prove isoperimetric bounds of "second order". These allow to establish the existence of a large interface where 3 bodies touch. As far as we know, our result is the first one to establish such a bound in any context.
The canonical path method. Before describing our techniques, we briefly recall the canonical path method [JS90] . Given a graph G and a subset A of its vertices, a general approach to proving a lower bound on the 'surface area' of A-namely the number of vertices in A that are attached by an edge to a vertex outside of A-is as follows: for each pair x, y of vertices in G such that x ∈ A and y ∈ A, determine a path in G between them, called the canonical path between x and y. Since x is in A and y is not, there is at least one surface vertex on each canonical path. So if one manages to prove that each surface vertex lies on at most r canonical paths, it immediately follows that the surface of A contains at least |A|·|Ā| r vertices, giving the required lower bound on the surface area of A.
Manipulation paths. Think of the graph G having the set L n q of all ranking profiles as the vertex set, where the pair (x, y) is an edge if x and y differ on at most one coordinate. A social choice function f : L n q → [q] naturally partitions the vertices of G into q subsets. Our main interest is not in the surface area of these subsets, however, but in the number of manipulation points.
Our approach in the proof of Theorem 1.5 is therefore the following: we consider four subsets f −1 (A), f −1 (B), f −1 (C) and f −1 (D), where the outcome is A, B, C and D respectively. We first use elementary methods to show that many edges in our graph lie on the interface between f −1 (A) and f −1 (B), namely have one vertex from each of the subsets. Similarly, many edges must lie on the interface between f −1 (C) and f −1 (D).
We then define a so called manipulation path for each pair of edges consisting of one edge on the interface between f −1 (A) and f −1 (B), and one on the interface between f −1 (C) and f −1 (D). The path (of edges) has the property that it either stays in one interface or the other. If a path "transitions" from the interface between f −1 (A) and f −1 (B) and the interface between f −1 (C) and f −1 (D) then around the transition point the function must obtain at least 3 values. This realization allows us to apply the original Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and associate a manipulation point with the path. Much of the work is then devoted to bounding the number of paths that can correspond to each manipulation point.
A refined geometry. To obtain the improved parameters of Theorem 1.7 we use a proof scheme similar to that of Theorem 1.5, however we use an underlying graph with a different edge structure. Instead of connecting every pair x, y ∈ L n q of ranking profiles that differ in just one coordinate, we connect x and y only if in the coordinate i in which they differ, y i can be obtained from x i by a single transposition. In the case where n = 1 this is the graph that's studied in the analysis of the adjacent transposition card shuffling [Ald83, Wil04] . The proof of the refined result requires to show that geometric and combinatorial quantities such as boundaries and manipulation points are roughly the same in the refined graph as in the original graph on L n q . This proof requires the development of a number of techniques, in particular the study of canonical paths under group actions.
Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we set some notations, definitions, and some general observations. We prove Theorem 1.5 in Sections 3, 4 and 5. Theorem 1.7 is proved in Sections 6, 7, and 8. Finally, some open problems appear in Section 9.
Setup and notation
Rankings. We denote by L q the set of rankings of q alternatives. An element x ∈ L q is a permutation of the set [q]. The elements ranked at top by x is x(1), the second is x(2) etc. Given another element y ∈ L q , their composition yx is the ranking where the element ranked at the top is y(x(1)) etc.
More generally we will also sometimes use L S to denote the set of rankings of a set S.
be a social choice function. We say that f is neutral if for every x ∈ L n q and every y ∈ L q , y(f (x)) = f (yx 1 , . . . , yx n ). Informally f is neutral if the names of the alternatives do not matter when applying f .
Influences and Variance.
We call a function f : L n q → [q] a social choice function and define the influence of the i:th coordinate on f as Inf i (f ) = P(f (X) = f (X (i) )) where X is uniform on L n q and X (i) is obtained from X by re-randomizing the i:th coordinate. Similarly we define the influence of the i:th coordinate w.r.t. to a single alternative a ∈ [q] or a pair of alternatives a, b ∈ [q] as Inf
and Inf
respectively. We also define the total influence of f as Inf(f ) = n i=1 Inf i (f ). The following relationship is obvious,
The following standard proposition bounds the total influence with respect to a given candidate from below by the variance with respect to that candidate.
where X ∈ L n q is uniformly selected.
Proof. Create a random walk X = X (0) , . . . , X (n) = Y from X by re-randomizing the i:th coordinate in the i:th step, i.e. for i ∈ [n], X (i) ∈ L n q is obtained by re-randomizing the i:th coordinate of X (i−1) . Letting g(x) = 1 {f (x)=a} and using that X, Y are independent and that if g(X) = g(Y ) then the value of g has to change at some edge on the path we have
Further, if a function is far from all constants all such variances cannot be small:
nq 2 (q−1) . We first claim that for all {a, b} there exists {c, d} such that {c, d} = {a, b} and A c,d = ∅. Note that f being ǫ-far from taking two values asserts that we can find a c / ∈ {a, b} such that
hence there must exist some d = c and i ∈ [n] such that Inf
, and thus
To see this, assume the contrary, i.e. ∪ a,b A a,b ⊆ {i} for some i ∈ [n]. Then for all j = i it holds that
. . , x n ) and note that for j = i,
while Inf i (f σ ) = 0. Hence, by (11), we have
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.4 and Proposition 2.3. But this means that f is ǫ/2-close to a dictator, contradicting the assumption that D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ. Hence (10) holds. Therefore we can either find i = j and {a, b} = {c, d} such that i ∈ A a,b and j ∈ A c,d which proves the theorem, or we must have |A a,b | ≥ 2 for some {a, b} while A c,d = ∅ for any {c, d} = {a, b}. However, this contradicts the first claim in the proof. The result follows.
As a simple corollary we have that assuming neutrality and q ≥ 4 we may assume a, b, c, d are all distinct,
Proof. Neutrality of f implies that f is 1 − 2/q ≥ 1/2 far from the set of functions taking at most 2 values. Since ǫ ≤ 1 it follows that D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ/2 Moreover, by neutrality, Inf a,b i does not depend on {a, b} so we can choose {a, b} and {c, d} non-intersecting.
First Construction of Manipulation Paths
Similar to the definition of influence, let us now define f 's boundary in the i:th direction w.r.t. the alternatives a, b ∈ [q] as
The main idea of the proof is to define a canonical path between every pair of points on B
We now define the graph that we are working with:
Definition 4.1. The voting graph is the graph whose vertex set is L n q and whose edges are of the form x, y where x j = y j for all j = i and x i = y i .
We begin our definition of a canonical path by considering the case of one voter. j . To simplify notation we assume that i = n − 1 and j = n. The path is of length 2n and is defined by first making all type I moves and then making all type II moves.
where only coordinate k is updated at the k:th first step and the k:th last step, i.e. for all k and all s = k:
,
are the canonical paths in Definition 4.2.
Manipulation Points and First Proof
Lemma 5.1. For any f :
Proof. Without loss of generality, let i = n−1 and j = n. 3. The middle edge (x (n−2) , x ′(n−2) ), (z (n−2) , z ′(n−2) ) connects a pair with values (a, b) and a pair with values (c, d).
Let (u, u ′ ), (v, v ′ ) be the first edge where one of I. or II. holds and note that u, u ′ , v, v ′ agree in all but two coordinates, either {n − 1, k}, {n, k} or {n, n − 1} depending on whether the edge (u, u ′ ), (v, v ′ ) is on the first part of the path, the second part or is the middle edge.
We now claim that we can find a manipulation point y such that u, u ′ , v, v ′ and y agree in all but two coordinates. We will let h((x, x ′ ), (z, z ′ )) be this y.
For case I. this is obvious and we can let y be the any of u, u ′ , v, v which is a manipulation point.
For case II., by applying the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Th. 1.2) on the restriction of f to the two coordinates on which u, u ′ , v, v ′ differ we can identify a manipulation point y ∈ L n q which only differ from u, u ′ , v, v ′ on these two coordinates and also is a manipulation point of the original function f (if there is more than one possible manipulation point we can just pick say the lexicographically smallest one). It remains to count the number of inverses of a manipulation point y associated with the edge (u, u ′ ), (v, v ′ ) which can be any of the 2n − 3 edges of the canonical path. Given the edge number and y, there are only (q!) 2 possibilities for u. Given u and the edge number there are only (q!) n possibilities for x and z. To see this note that for each k ∈ [n] we must have either
• u k = x k . In this case there are q! possibilities for z k .
• u k = z k . In this case there are q! possibilities for x k .
• x k , u k , z k is the canonical path from Definition 4.2 between x k and z k . Then there are q! 2 possibilities for x k and 2 possibilities for z k .
Finally, given x and z there are at most (q!) 2 possibilities for x ′ and z ′ . Overall we have:
Proof of Theorem 1.5. By Corollary 3.2 we can find distinct i, j ∈ [n] and distinct a, b, c, d
Applying Lemma 5.1 we see that
Canonical Paths and Group Actions
In order to derive the more refined result, we will need to consider in more detail the properties of the permutation group L q with respect to adjacent transpositions. Again we use canonical paths arguments. We state the arguments in a more general setup.
Definition 6.1. Let L be a set.
• Let P L (ℓ) denote the set of paths of length at most ℓ in L and P L = ∪ ℓ∈N P L (l) the set of paths of finite length.
•
which satisfies that Γ(x, y) begins at x and ends at y for all
• Given a canonical path map Γ : L 1 × L 2 → P L (ℓ) and 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ we define the inverse image mapping of the i'th vertex, Γ
Further, we let
• Given a group H acting on L we say that a canonical path map Γ :
Γ(hx, hy) = hΓ(x, y),
We will use the following proposition. Recall that a group H acting on L is called fixedpoint-free if for all x ∈ L and all h ∈ H different than the identity it holds that hx = x. Proposition 6.2. Let H be a fixed-point-free group acting on L and let Γ :
be a canonical path map that is H-invariant. Then for all z ∈ L and 0 ≤ i ≤ l it holds that
and
Proof. Note that for all i,
where the first inequality follows since the value of the i'th vertex partitions the set of paths of length at least i, the first equality since H is fixed-point-free, and the final equality from the path being H-invariant. We thus obtain:
as needed.
Two applications of the result above will be given for adjacent transpositions. We let T denote the set of all q(q − 1)/2 adjacent transpositions. Given z ∈ T , we define
where X (i) is obtained from X by re-randomizing the i:th coordinate X i in the following way: with probability 1/2 we keep it as X i and otherwise we replace it by zX i .
Finally for x ∈ L n q we will let [a : b] i x denote the element obtained by applying [a : b] on the i:th coordinate of x while leaving all other coordinates unchanged.
Proposition 6.4. There exists a canonical path map Γ : L q × L q → P Lq (ℓ) of length at most ℓ = q(q − 1)/2 < q 2 /2, all of whose edges are adjacent transpositions such that for all z it holds that:
Proof. Given x, y ∈ L q consider the following canonical path starting at x and ending at y. Take the element y(1) ranked at the top for y and bubble it to the top by performing adjacent transpositions. Then take the element y(2) ranked second for y and bubble it to the second position etc. Clearly the length of the path is at most q(q − 1)/2. Let H = {x → px | p ∈ L q } be the group of compositions with all possible permutations of the candidates. Since H is a fixed-point-free group acting on L q and the described canonical path map is H-invariant the result follows from Proposition 6.2.
where T is the set of all adjacent transpositions.
Proof. This is a standard canonical path argument. Since both sides of the desired inequality involve averaging over all coordinates but the i'th coordinate, it follows that it suffices to prove the claim in the case where
Consider the canonical path map Γ constructed in Proposition 6.4. Note that each canonical path between an element in A := {x ∈ L q | f (x) = a} and an element in A c must pass via one of the edges in B. Define h : A × A C → B by letting h(x, y) be the first edge in B which Γ(x, y) passes through. Then by (24), for any (u, v) ∈ B,
Combining (26) and (28) we obtain:
A second application of Proposition 6.4 is the following.
Proposition 6.6. Fix two elements a, b ∈ [q] and let B ⊆ L q denote the set of all permutations where a is ranked above b. Then there exists a canonical path map Γ : B × B → P B (q 2 ) consisting of adjacent transpositions such that all permutations along the path satisfy that a is ranked above b. Moreover for all z it holds that:
Proof. Γ(x, y) is defined as follows. We look at all elements different than a, b, starting with the top one of y, and bubble each of them upwards to its position in y ignoring a, b. After we have done so, we have all elements but a, b ordered as in y, followed by a, followed by b.
We now bubble a to its location in y and then bubble b. Note that the length of the path so defined is at most
The proof now follows from Proposition 6.2 by considering the group H which acts by permuting arbitrary all elements but those labeled by a and b:
Refined Boundaries
Similarly to the previous construction we now define the i:th a-b boundary with respect to an adjacent swap z ∈ T as
and the boundary with respect to arbitrary adjacent swaps on the i:th coordinate as
Note that for a = b,
Manipulation points on refined boundaries
The following two lemmas identify manipulation points on these boundaries.
where a, b, c are distinct and i = j. Then there exists a 3 -manipulation point w ∈ L n q for f such that w k = y k for k / ∈ {i, j} and w i is equal to x i or y i except that the position of c may be shifted arbitrarily and w j is equal to z j or y j except that the position of a may be shifted arbitrarily.
Proof. By Lemma 7.1 we must have x i = [a : b]y i and z j = [c : b]y j , or x, y or z is a 2-manipulation point in which case we are done. Now create a new triple (x ′ , y ′ , z ′ ) by starting from (x, y, z) and simultaneously in the i:th coordinate of x, y and z, bubbling c towards the pair ab until it becomes adjacent to the pair. Since c is never swapped with a or b during this process Lemma 7.1 implies that for any intermediate triple ( x, y, z) we have f ( x) = a, f ( y) = b and f ( z) / ∈ {a, b}, or one of x, y and z is a 2-manipulation point. But since we also have z = [c : b] j y, we must actually have f ( z) = c, or either y or z is a 2-manipulation point.
Similarly bubbling a towards the pair bc in coordinate j starting from (x ′ , y ′ , z ′ ) gives us x ′′ , y ′′ , z ′′ all having a, b, c adjacent in coordinates i and j such that (x ′′ , y ′′ ) ∈ B . Note that x ′′ , y ′′ , z ′′ are equal except for a reordering of the blocks containing a, b, c in coordinates i and j. Now arbitrary adjacent swapping of a, b, c in these coordinates of x ′′ , y ′′ and z ′′ will keep the value of f in {a, b, c}, or give rise to a 2-manipulation point by Lemma 7.1. Thus we can define a social choice function with 2 voters and 3 candidates f ′ : L 2 {a,b,c} → {a, b, c} by letting f ′ (v) = f (g(v)), where g(v) ∈ L n q is obtained from x ′′ by simply reordering the two blocks of elements a, b, c in coordinates i and j to match v 1 and v 2 , respectively. Since f ′ takes three values and is not a dictator, Gibbard-Satterthwaite (Theorem 1.2) implies that f ′ has a manipulation point and hence f has a 3-manipulation point satisfying our requirements.
Large Refined Boundaries
Now we possess the right tools to prove the analogue of Lemma 3.1 for refined boundaries.
or there exist distinct i, j ∈ [n] and {a, b}, {c, d} ⊆ [q] such that c / ∈ {a, b} and
Proof. First, suppose that Inf (f ) at least one of x or x ′ = zx is a 2-manipulation point. Let M be the set of all such 2-manipulation points. Then
Dividing with (q!) n gives (30). Thus, for the remainder of the proof we may assume that
nq 7 . We first claim that for all {a, b} there exists {c, d} such that {c, d} = {a, b} and A c,d = ∅. Note that f being ǫ-far from taking two values asserts that we can find a c / ∈ {a, b} such that 1 − We next claim that
To see this, assume the contrary, i.e. ∪ a,b A a,b ⊆ {i} for some i ∈ [n]. Then, by Corollary 6.5, for all j = i it holds that
while Inf i (f σ ) = 0. Hence, by (35), we have
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.4 and Proposition 2.3. But this means that f is ǫ/2-close to a dictator, contradicting the assumption that D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ. Hence (34) holds. Therefore we can either find i = j and {a, b} = {c, d} such that i ∈ A a,b and j ∈ A c,d which proves the theorem, or we must have |A a,b | ≥ 2 for some {a, b} while A c,d = ∅ for any {c, d} = {a, b}. However, this contradicts the first claim in the proof. The result follows.
As a corollary we have that assuming neutrality and q ≥ 4 we may assume a, b, c, d are all distinct, 
Proof. Neutrality of f implies that D(f, NONMANIP) ≥ ǫ/2 and that Inf a,b i does not depend on {a, b} so we can choose {a, b} and {c, d} non-intersecting.
Refined Construction of Manipulation Paths
We now present the second construction of manipulation paths. In this construction edges along the path will consist of adjacent transpositions instead of general permutations as in the previous construction. Again we construct manipulation paths between every edge on B in a way such that each canonical path passes through (or "close" to) a manipulation point while making sure that no manipulation point can be passed by too many canonical paths. We call the paths so constructed refined manipulation paths. The main goal in the current construction compared to the previous one is to have better dependency on q, i.e. the number of inverse images of each manipulation point should be poly(n)poly(q)q! instead of 2n(q!) 4 q! as in the previous construction.
Let us first give two canonical paths on single coordinates that will be used as building blocks when constructing the refined canonical paths:
. Then there exists a canonical path map Γ : L q × L q → P Lq (q 2 + 2q) with the following properties:
• Γ is a concatenation of two paths I and Π.
• The edges in I are arbitrary adjacent transpositions except [a : b], thus keeping the order of a and b fixed.
• The edges in Π are arbitrary adjacent transpositions except [c : d], thus keeping the order of c and d fixed.
• For every y ∈ L q there are exactly q! pairs (x, z) ∈ L q × L q for which the last vertex of I (first vertex of Π) in the path Γ(x, z) is equal to y.
• For all y ∈ L q and i ≥ 0 we have |Γ Finally, by considering the group H which acts by permuting arbitrary all elements but those labeled by a, b, c and d and noting that |H| = (q − 4)! it follows from Proposition 6.2 that
Then there exists a canonical path map Γ : X×L q → P Lq (q 2 +2q) with the following properties:
• Γ is a concatenation of three paths I, ∆ and Π.
• All edges in I are adjacent transpositions not involving a and b, thus keeping the rank of a and b fixed.
• ∆ consists of a single edge which is a reordering of a block of exactly the 4 elements a, b, c, d.
• For every y ∈ L q there are at most 2q 3 q! pairs (x, z) ∈ L q × L q for which the last vertex of I in the path Γ(x, z) is equal to y. The same holds for the first vertex of Π.
• For all y ∈ L q and i ≥ 0 we have |Γ
Proof. Fix x ∈ X and z ∈ L q . The path I is constructed by first bubbling the element c towards the block ab until it is adjacent to this block and then doing the same with d. ∆ consists of a single edge which reorders the block of a, b, c and d so that the order matches that in z.
Π is constructed as in Proposition 6.6 while preserving the order of c and d.
Note that the length of I and Π is at most 2q − 1 and q 2 respectively. Finally, by considering the group H which acts by permuting arbitrary all elements but those labeled by a, b, c and d it follows follows from Proposition 6.2 that
The other properties are easy to verify.
We are now ready to define the canonical path from B (f ). This path is over (L n q ) 2 . If we only consider the first element of each such pair, then the path can informally be described as being constructed by concatenating three paths I, ∆ and Π where I is constructed by updating one coordinate at a time, using the path I of Proposition 8.1 for each coordinate k / ∈ {i, j}, using the path I from Proposition 8.2 for coordinate i and finally for coordinate j using the reverse of the path Π of Proposition 8.2 where the role of elements a, b have been interchanged with that of c, d. The path ∆ do the middle step from Proposition 8.1 for both i and j. The path Π then updates each coordinate again using the remaining part of each path above.
Then there exists a canonical path map Γ : X × Z → P (L n q ) 2 (2n(q 2 + 2)) with the following properties:
• I stays in X and for all edges ((v, v ′ ), (w, w ′ )) in I both (v, w) and (v ′ , w ′ ) consist of single adjacent transpositions that preserve the order of a and b in each coordinate and keep the rank of a and b fixed in coordinate i.
• Π stays in Z and for all edges ((v, v ′ ), (w, w ′ )) in Π both (v, w) and (v ′ , w ′ ) consist of single adjacent transpositions that preserve the order of c and d in each coordinate and keep the rank of c and d fixed in coordinate j.
• ∆ consists of a single edge ((v, v ′ ), (w, w ′ )) such that v, v ′ , w, w ′ are all equal up to a reordering of a block of elements a, b, c, d in coordinates i and j.
Proof. To define Γ fix a starting pair (x, x ′ ) ∈ X and an ending pair (z, z ′ ) ∈ Z. For this pair, the paths I and Π are both constructed as a concatenation of n paths: I = I(1), . . . , I(n) and Π = Π(1), . . . , Π(n)
In order to define these paths first note that since I must stay in X, every vertex (v, (0) , . . . , u k (ℓ)) denote its restriction to coordinate k. The projections I and Π can then be defined as follows,
• For any k = 1, . . . , n−1 the last vertex of I(k) is equal to the first vertex of I(k + 1), and the last vertex of Π(k) is equal to the first vertex of Π(k + 1).
• ∀k, m = k : I m (k) and Π m (k) are constant paths, i.e. I(k) and Π(k) only change in coordinate k.
• ∀k / ∈ {i, j} : I k (k) and Π k (k) are the paths I and Π making up Γ(x k , z k ) in Proposition 8.1.
• I i (i) and Π i (i) are the paths I and Π making up Γ(x i , z i ) in Proposition 8.2.
• I j (j) and Π j (j) are, respectively, the reverse of the paths Π and I making up Γ(z j , x j ) in Proposition 8.2 with the role of (a, b) there swapped with that of (c, d).
Note that this uniquely determines ∆ as the single edge from the last vertex of I to the first vertex of Π. The three statements about the edges of Γ now follow from Proposition 8.1 and 8.2. Finally, to compute |Γ −1 ((v, v ′ ))| for (v, v ′ ) ∈ (L n q ) 2 we need to count the number of (x, x ′ ) ∈ X and (z, z ′ ) ∈ Z such that (v, v ′ ) is a vertex on the path. Note that |Γ −1 ((v, v ′ ))| = 0 unless (v, v ′ ) ∈ X or (v, v ′ ) ∈ Z. Without loss of generality assume that (v, v ′ ) ∈ X (the argument for (v, v ′ ) ∈ Z is symmetric). Then v could belong to any of the n paths I(1), . . . , I(n). Suppose it belongs I(m). No matter what m is, v can be any of at most q 2 + 2q + 1 vertices on the path I(m). If m / ∈ {i, j} then by Proposition 8.1 there can be at most q 4 q! possibilities for (x m , z m ), and if m ∈ {i, j} then by Proposition 8.2 there can be at most 2q 3 q! < q 4 q! possibilities for (x m , z m ). For all other coordinates k = m we have that v k equals either x k or the last vertex of I(k). In both cases there are by Proposition 8.2 at most 2q 3 q! possibilities for (x k , z k ) if k ∈ {i, j}, and by Proposition 8.1 exactly q! possibilities for (x k , z k ) if k / ∈ {i, j} and Finally, since (x, x ′ ) ∈ X and (z, z ′ ) ∈ Y there is at most one possibility for x ′ and z ′ given x and z. Hence we have, (f ). Then there exist a refined canonical path Γ = Γ((x, x ′ ), (z, z ′ )) (being a concatenation of three paths I, ∆ and Π) satisfying the properties of Proposition 8. 3 . We now claim the following:
Claim: Somewhere on this path there will be a vertex (v, v ′ ) such that v is close to a 4-manipulation point y, in the sense that it differs from y in at most 2 coordinates, and in each of those two coordinates it only differs by a reordering of the elements a, b, c and d and an arbitrary shifting of a single element in [q].
We will take h((x, x ′ ), (z, z ′ )) to be an arbitrary 4-manipulation point y satisfying the closeness requirement in the claim for some vertex on the path. Now note that along this path at least one of the following three things must happen:
simply re-randomizing one of the coordinates, which is the one considered in [FKN09] , we only have a lower bound where q! appears in the denominator (see Corollary 1.6). It would be interesting to prove a polynomial lower bound in the latter case.
• As is often the case with arguments involving canonical paths, we suspect that the parameters we obtained are not tight. It would be interesting to find the correct tight bounds. In particular, we are not even sure that the lower bound on the number of manipulation points must decrease with q-the correct bound may even increase as a function of q for neutral functions.
• Our results, as well as those of [FKN09] , apply only to neutral functions. Can one prove a quantitative Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for non-neutral functions?
• It would also be interesting to consider the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem quantitatively for non-uniform distributions over preferences.
